Lissabondagi Rodeziya missiyasi - Rhodesian mission in Lisbon - Wikipedia

Rodeziya
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Rodeziya

The Lissabondagi Rodeziya missiyasi (Portugal: Missão da Rodésia em Lisboa), Portugaliya poytaxti, 1965 yil sentyabrdan 1975 yil maygacha ishlagan. Bu a diplomatik vakolatxona vakili Rodeziya (yoki Janubiy Rodeziya ), dastlab a sifatida o'z-o'zini boshqarish koloniyasi Britaniya va, keyin Mustaqillikning bir tomonlama deklaratsiyasi 1965 yil noyabrda, sifatida tan olinmagan holat.Rodeziya Britaniyani Lissabonda boshchiligidagi missiyani ochish niyati to'g'risida xabardor qildi akkreditatsiyadan o'tgan vakil, 1965 yil iyun oyida Britaniyaning shahardagi elchixonasidan mustaqil. Uaytxoll g'oyani ma'qullashdan bosh tortdi, ammo Rodeziya baribir davom etdi va shu oyning oxirida Garri Ridmanni missiyani boshqarishga tayinladi. Angliya hukumati bir necha oydan beri ushbu bir tomonlama harakatni - Rodeziyaning birinchi harakatini to'sishga muvaffaq bo'lmadi.

Bu ish Uaytxoll va o'rtasida katta mojaro fonida yuzaga keldi Solsberi Rodeziya berilishi mumkin bo'lgan shartlar to'g'risida suveren mustaqillik. Rodosiyaning aksariyat oq tanli hukumati davlatchilik 1961 yilda Buyuk Britaniyaning ma'qullashi bilan kiritilgan konstitutsiyaga muvofiq bo'lishi kerak, deb ta'kidlagan bo'lsa, Uaytxoll qora tanli ko'pchilik hukmronligini joriy etish jadvali mamlakat to'liq mustaqil bo'lishidan oldin amalga oshirilishi kerakligini ta'kidladi. Rodeziya hukumatining bu boradagi pozitsiyasi uning ichida izolyatsiya qilinishiga olib keldi Hamdo'stlik 1964 yildan boshlab uni o'zining ichki organlarining ko'pchiligidan chiqarib tashladi, Rodeziya harbiylari esa o'zining ingliz va amerika ta'minotchilari tomonidan norasmiy ravishda embargoga uchradi.

1923 yildan beri Rodeziya o'zini o'zi boshqaradigan mustamlaka sifatida ish yuritgan, ammo tashqi ishlar uchun javobgarlik Buyuk Britaniyada qoldi. Rodeziyaning zudlik bilan qora hukmronlikka qarshi qat'iy qarama-qarshiligi va Angliyaga nisbatan ko'ngli qolgani uni boshqargan Portugaliyaga qaratdi. Angola va Mozambik, Rodeziyaning g'arbiy va sharqiy qismidagi hududlar. Rodeziyaliklar mustaqil Lissabon missiyasining qonuniy ekanligini isbotlashga urinishlarida, Angliya qonunchiligiga asoslanib, mustamlaka hukumatiga o'zlarining "diplomatik agentlarini yoki konsullik yoki savdo vakillarini qabul qilishga tayyor mamlakatlarda tayinlash huquqini berish to'g'risida argument keltirdilar. ular ".[1] Britaniyaliklar Rodeziya tashqi aloqalari borasidagi asosiy nuqtai nazar hali ham Uaytxollga tegishli edi. Ular Ridmanni Rodeziyalik sifatida Britaniyaning Lissabondagi elchixonasiga qo'shilishini taklif qilishdi konsul, ammo Rodeziya Ridman uchun Janubiy Afrika va Mozambikdagi mustaqil Rodeziya vakillari yoqqanidan kamroq lavozimni qabul qilishdan bosh tortdi.

Bir necha oylik abortli Anglo-Rodeziya muzokaralari va Buyuk Britaniyaning Portugaliyani diplomatik yo'l bilan to'xtatish bo'yicha muvaffaqiyatsiz urinishlaridan so'ng, Ridman 1965 yil sentyabr oyida mustaqil Rodeziya missiyasi boshlig'i lavozimini egallash uchun Lissabonga yo'l oldi. The Portugaliya tashqi ishlar vazirligi Rodeziyaga nisbatan betaraf bo'lganini ta'kidlagan Ridmanning akkreditatsiya xatini qabul qilib, Uaytxollni g'azablantirdi - garchi Lissabon Britaniyani qo'zg'atmaslikdan ehtiyot bo'lib, Ridmanga ham, uning missiyasiga ham berilgan unvonlardan "diplomatik" so'zini chiqarib tashladi. Rodeziyaliklar Lissabonda mustaqil diplomatik vakolatxonani egallashga kirishgan va hozirda shunday vakili borligini aytib, o'zlarini hali ham g'olib deb bildilar. Keyinchalik tarixchi JR T Vud buni "Rodeziyaning birinchi mustaqil va haqiqatan ham bir tomonlama harakati - shamoldagi haqiqiy somon" deb atadi.[1] 1965 yil 11-noyabrda, Ridman sarmoyasidan ikki oy o'tmasdan, Rodeziya yana oldinga o'tdi va bir tomonlama ravishda Britaniyadan mustaqilligini e'lon qildi. Lissabondagi missiya 1975 yilgacha faoliyat yuritib, u quyidagi vaqtdan keyin yopilgan edi Chinnigullar inqilobi o'tgan yili Portugaliyada.

Fon

Mas'ul hukumat, Federatsiya va o'zgarish shamoli

Rodeziya va Nyasaland xaritasi
The Rodeziya va Nyasaland federatsiyasi (1953–63)

Bo'lgan boshqariladi va rivojlanadi tomonidan Britaniyaning Janubiy Afrika kompaniyasi 1890-yillardan boshlab, Janubiy Rodeziya bo'ldi o'z-o'zini boshqarish koloniyasi ichida Britaniya imperiyasi 1923 yilda, u berilganda mas'ul hukumat tomonidan Uaytxoll. Janubiy Rodeziya poytaxti, Solsberi, bundan buyon deyarli barcha masalalarda, shu jumladan mudofaada o'z ishlarini yuritish vakolatiga ega edi.[2] Tashqi ishlar Buyuk Britaniya hukumati tomonidan saqlanadigan oz sonli sohalardan biri edi.[n 1] Imperiyaning yakka o'zi boshqaradigan mustamlakasi sifatida Janubiy Rodeziya a sui generis holda, deyarli a bilan teng hukmronlik. Boshlash 1932, Imperatorlik konferentsiyalari dominionlar qatorida Janubiy Rodeziya Bosh vaziri,[5] Imperatorlik konferentsiyalaridan keyin davom etgan noyob vaziyat Hamdo'stlik Bosh vazirlarining konferentsiyalari 1944 yilda.[6]

Janubiy Rodeziya siyosatchilarining aksariyati buni ko'rganidek, ular mustaqil kabi yaxshi edilar; agar hukmronlik shaklida to'liq avtonomiya berilsa, yagona amaliy farq chet el vakolatxonasi xarajatlarining oshishi bo'ladi, chunki Solsberi chet elda o'z elchixonalarini saqlab turishi kerak edi. To'liq hukmronlik maqomining samarali ramziy bo'lishiga ishonish va "so'raladigan joyda",[7] Bosh Vazir Godfri Xaggins (1933 yildan 1953 yilgacha bo'lgan lavozimda) mustaqillikni muammo emas deb hisoblagan.[7] U ikki karra inglizlarning dominion maqomiga ishora qilishdan bosh tortdi,[8] va buning o'rniga dastlab yarim mustaqillikni ta'qib qildi Federatsiya ning to'g'ridan-to'g'ri boshqariladigan Britaniya mustamlakalari bilan Shimoliy Rodeziya va Nyasaland.[8]

Natijalari bilan belgilanadi 1953 yilgi referendum, Federatsiya o'sha yilning oxirida uchta hududning eng rivojlangani bo'lgan Janubiy Rodeziya bilan boshlandi. Solsberi Federal kapital sifatida ikki baravar ko'paydi.[9] Avvalgi yillarda Federatsiya Buyuk Britaniya tomonidan bir qator imtiyozlarga ega bo'ldi; masalan, 1957 yildagi ingliz Parlament akti unga "diplomatik agentlarni yoki konsullik yoki savdo vakillarini, ularni qabul qilishga tayyor bo'lgan mamlakatlarda" tayinlash huquqini bergan bo'lsa, Angliya buni amalga oshirayotganda xabar bergan ekan.[n 2] Ushbu tayinlashlarning eng ko'zga ko'ringanlari 1961 yilda, qachon bo'lgan Janubiy Afrika Ittifoqi dan ajratilgan Millatlar Hamdo'stligi va respublikaga aylandi. Solsberining vakolatli vakili tashkil etildi Pretoriya tez orada, Britaniyaning u yerdagi elchixonasidan mustaqil.[10] Shuningdek, Federatsiya vakili bo'lgan mustaqil idora tashkil etildi Lourenço Markes, poytaxti Portugaliyaning Mozambik, uzoqroq masofada, Federal amaldorlar ichida tashkil etildi Buyuk Britaniyaning Yaponiyadagi elchixonalari, G'arbiy Germaniya va AQSH.[11]

50-yillarning oxiri va 60-yillarning boshlarida xalqaro munosabatlarning o'zgarishi va qora millatchilik ambitsiyalari ko'tarilishi sababli Federatsiya oxir-oqibat muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchradi, ko'pincha " O'zgarishlar shamoli.[12] "G'oyasiko'pchilik hukmronligidan oldin mustaqillik yo'q "Buyuk Britaniya sifatida Britaniyaning siyosiy doiralarida katta mavqega ega bo'ldi, Frantsiya va Belgiya ularning qit'adan chiqib ketishini juda tezlashtirdi.[13] Ko'plab qonli fuqarolar urushlari, harbiy to'ntarishlar va boshqa falokatlar fonida yangi Afrika davlatlarining aksariyati bir necha yil ichida avtokratik yakka partiyalarga aylanishdi.[14] Allaqachon ehtiyot bo'ling qora millatchilik irqiy asoslarga ko'ra, Solsberi ushbu o'zgarishlar natijasida tobora antipatik bo'lib qoldi, ayniqsa shafqatsiz Kongo inqirozi minglab Kongo oqlarining Shimoliy va Janubiy Rodeziyada qochqin bo'lishiga sabab bo'ldi.[15] 1962 yilda, Federatsiya o'zining konstitutsiyaviy o'limida, Nyasalendning ajralib chiqish va zudlik bilan qora boshqaruvni talab qilishi fonida, Federal Bosh vazir Roy Welenskiy Britaniya tomonidan aytilganidan dahshatga tushdi va g'azablandi Hamdo'stlik aloqalari bo'yicha davlat kotibi, Dunkan Sandis, "biz inglizlar boshqarish irodasini yo'qotdik".[16] "Ammo bizda yo'q", deb javob qildi Julian Grinfild, Welenskiyning qonun vaziri.[17]

Federal tarqatib yuborish; Solsberi mustaqillikka intilmoqda

Janubiy Rodeziyaliklar Federal tarqatib yuborilgan taqdirda, ular mustaqillik uchun birinchi navbatda bo'lishlarini taxmin qilishdi,[18] va uni 1961 yilgi konstitutsiyasiga jiddiy tuzatishlarsiz qabul qilishadi.[n 3] Darhaqiqat, 1963 yil boshlarida hukumatlararo yozishmalar Solsberining shunday bo'lganiga ishonishini tasdiqlash uchun juda ko'p ish qildi.[20][n 4] Federal tarqoq muzokaralar davom etar ekan, Sandys a niyat xati Britaniya hukumati tomonidan Federal hukumatga berilgan vakolatlar Federatsiya oxirida Janubiy Rodeziyaga o'tishini aytdi. Solsberi Federal chet el vakolatxonalarini Pretoriya va Lorenso Markesda, shuningdek Buyuk Britaniya elchixonasi partiyalarini saqlashga kelishib olindi. Bonn, Tokio va Vashington.[11] Federal tarqatib yuborish bo'yicha kelishuvlar 1963 yil o'rtalarida tuzilgan va Federatsiya rasmiy ravishda o'sha yilning 31 dekabrida tugagan.[23] Shimoliy Rodeziya va Nyasaland 1964 yilda mustaqil bo'lib, qora tanli ko'pchilik hukumatlari ostida navbati bilan Zambiya va Malavi deb o'zgartirildi.[24] Oq tanlilar juda ustun mavqega ega ekanligi va hukumatning g'azabiga va g'azabiga sabab bo'lganligi sababli Janubiy Rodeziya ham rad etildi Rodeziya fronti (RF) va uning tarafdorlari.[8] Bosh Vazir Uinston Fild 1964 yil boshida Britaniyadan mustaqillikni ta'minlay olmaganligi uning majburiy iste'foga chiqishiga va uning o'rinbosari bilan almashtirilishiga olib keldi. Yan Smit, o'sha yilning aprelida.[25]

Bosh vazirlik lavozimidan ikki oy o'tgach, Smit Uaytxoll bundan buyon birinchi marta unga xabar berganida, qattiq xafa bo'ldi 1932, Janubiy Rodeziya Hamdo'stlik Bosh vazirlari yilgi konferentsiyasida qatnashmaydi, chunki kelajakda faqat to'liq mustaqil davlatlarni o'z ichiga olgan qaror qabul qilingan.[26] Mustaqillik shartlari bo'yicha janjal Janubiy Rodeziya armiyasining an'anaviy ingliz va amerika etkazib beruvchilarini norasmiy embargoga olib keldi,[1] va Britaniyani Solsberiga moliyaviy yordamni bir vaqtning o'zida to'xtatishga undadi. Qo'shma Shtatlar zudlik bilan unga ergashdi.[n 5] Rodeziyadagi raqib qora millatchi harakatlar o'rtasidagi siyosiy zo'ravonlik 1964 yil o'rtalarida kuchaygan,[29] bir nechta taniqli millatchilar uchun qamoq jazosiga yoki profilaktik cheklovlarga, ularning partiyalariga bir vaqtning o'zida taqiqlanishiga olib keladi.[n 6] 1964 yil oktyabrda Shimoliy Rodeziya Zambiyaga aylangach, Janubiy Rodeziya "Janubiy" ni o'z nomidan olib tashladi va shu sababli qonun chiqardi, ammo Angliya mustamlaka qonuniy ravishda o'z nomini o'zgartira olmaydi, deb rozilik bermadi. Solsberi baribir qisqartirilgan ismdan foydalanishda davom etdi.[31]

Rodeziya hukumati ashaddiy antikommunist edi va Smitning aytishicha, "bizning mamlakatimiz yo'q qilinishiga olib keladi" degan zudlik bilan qora hukmronlikka qarshi chiqdi,[32] dalil sifatida Kongo inqirozi kabi davom etayotgan voqealarga ishora qilmoqda.[32] Parlament asosan oq tanli bo'lib qoldi, ammo Solsberi, 1961 yilgi konstitutsiyaga binoan mustaqillikni qo'lga kiritishda barcha irqlarning bir ovozdan qo'llab-quvvatlaganiga da'vo qilib, 1964 yil oxirida o'tkazilgan turli xil fikrlar sinovlarini keltirdi.[n 7] Bosh vazir o'ta radikal deb hisoblagan har qanday konstitutsiyaviy o'zgarishlarga qarshi qat'iyat bilan turib oldi va buni milliy va mintaqaviy xavfsizlik masalasi sifatida qabul qildi. Uning esdaliklariga ko'ra, u "aqldan ozib ketishning oldini olish uchun ishlagan bitta odam, bitta ovoz Biz atrofimizdagi barcha mamlakatlarda ko'rgan barcha korruptsiya, qarindoshlik, betartiblik va iqtisodiy halokat bilan. "[34] The Mehnat Buyuk Britaniya Bosh vaziri kabineti Garold Uilson, oldingi o'rnini egallagan Konservativ ma'muriyat 1964 yil oktyabr, Rodeziya fikri sinovlariga ishonch bildirmadi va mustaqillik sharti sifatida ko'pchilik hukmronligini talab qildi.[35] Hamdo'stlik, Rodeziyaga bo'ysunmaslik davom etsa, Britaniyani to'g'ridan-to'g'ri aralashishga chaqirdi,[36] Britaniyalik liberallar, agar tekshirilmasa, Solsberi Janubiy Afrika uslubiga o'tishi mumkinligidan xavotirda edi aparteid.[37]

Britaniya, Portugaliya va Rodeziya

Xarita. Tavsifiga qarang
Portugaliya (P), Rodeziya (RH) va Janubiy Afrika (SA) 1960 yillari davomida Afrikaning janubida Angliya "itoatkor va bir-birini qo'llab-quvvatlovchi blok" deb atagan.[38]

Britaniyalik siyosatchilar Portugaliyani an'anaviy do'st, deb hisoblashgan Angliya-Portugaliya ittifoqi orqaga qaytish 1386 yilgacha va ikkala mamlakat ham Shimoliy Atlantika Shartnomasi Tashkiloti (NATO) va Evropa erkin savdo uyushmasi - ammo kuchning umumiy kuchi kommunistik blok va Afro-Osiyo qabulxonasi ichida Birlashgan Millatlar inglizlarni qo'llab-quvvatlashni qaytarishga majbur qildi plurikontinental Estado Novo ("Yangi davlat") 1960 yillarning boshlarida. Portugaliyaning Mustamlaka urushi, 1961 yildan Angoladan boshlab, uni Afrikadagi hududlarda partizanlarning bir qator guruhlariga qarshi chiqardi, ularning aksariyati kommunistik siyosiy fikrlashga obuna bo'lishdi. Buyuk Britaniya Afrikaning janubiy qismiga kommunistik tajovuzlarga qarshi chiqdi, ammo agar u mustamlakachilikni har qanday shaklda atroflicha qoralagan va mintaqadagi kommunistlar tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlangan qo'zg'olonlarni irqiy ozodlik harakatlari deb bilgan BMTdagi umumiy konsensusga qarshi chiqsa, bu xalqaro pariahga aylanishini bilar edi. Shuning uchun u Portugaliyaga qarshi hech qanday ahamiyatga ega bo'lmagan holda paydo bo'ladigan noqulay muvozanat harakatini amalga oshirishga harakat qildi.[39][40]

Buyuk Britaniyaning Rodeziyaga nisbatan pozitsiyasiga xuddi shunday ta'sir ko'rsatdi, Uaytxoll ko'pchilik hukmronligi oldidan xalqaro shov-shuvga sabab bo'lmasdan mustaqillik siyosatidan qaytolmadi.[41] Shuningdek, Britaniyaning Afrikadagi siyosatiga nisbatan nomutanosiblik ta'sir ko'rsatdi Julius Nyerere, zarur bo'lganda harbiy kuch bilan amalga oshirilgan, butun Afrika bo'ylab kechiktirmasdan ko'pchilik hukmronligining g'ayratli tarafdori bo'lgan Tanzaniya Prezidenti. Britaniyalik siyosatchilar 1960 va 70-yillarda Rodeziya bilan bog'liq deyarli har qanday takliflari bo'yicha Nyerereni kechiktirdilar.[42] Federatsiyadan keyingi darhol davrda Angliya xafsalasi bilan Rodeziyani bundan keyin ham bo'g'ishga urindi Janubiy Afrika va Portugaliya bilan moslashish, bu uch bir-biri bilan chambarchas bog'liq bo'lgan holda, Britaniyaning mintaqadagi ta'siri keskin cheklanganligini anglab etdi. 1965 yildagi Britaniya hukumati memorandumida bu uchlik "defitant va o'zaro yordam beradigan blok" deb ta'riflangan.[38]

Smit va uning portugaliyalik hamkasbi o'rtasida ajoyib shaxsiy munosabat, António de Oliveira Salazar. 1964 yil sentyabr oyida Portugaliyada bo'lib o'tgan birinchi uchrashuvda ikki hukumat rahbarlari o'z mamlakatlaridagi irq munosabatlari, Buyuk Britaniyaning Hamdo'stlik bilan munosabatlari va Smit "erkin dunyoning yirik davlatlarining xotirjamligi" deb atagan narsalar to'g'risida ko'plab umumiy fikrlarni o'rtoqlashdilar. juftlik cheksiz kommunistik ekspansionizm deb ko'rgan narsaning yuzi. Smitning Rodeziya mustaqilligi tarafdori bo'lgan argumentini eshitgandan so'ng, Salazar xususiy ravishda Portugaliyani to'liq qo'llab-quvvatlashga va'da berdi.[43] RF yangi umumiy saylovni tayinladi 1965 yil may va, an saylov va'dasi mustaqillik, barcha 50 "A" o'rindiqli o'rindiqlarni toza tarzda yutib oldi.[44] Bir hafta o'tgach, Uilson portugaliyaliklar bilan uchrashdi Tashqi ishlar vaziri Portugaliyaning Rodeziya bilan yashirin muomalalarida bosim o'tkazgan Alberto Franko Nogeyra. Nogueira bunday narsalarni qat'iyan rad etdi.[38]

Rodeziya Britaniyaning Lissabon missiyasini tasdiqlashiga intilmoqda

Gibbsning 9 iyundagi nutqi

Rodeziya fronti 1965 yil may oyida bo'lib o'tgan saylovda g'alaba qozonganidan so'ng, parlament inglizlar tomonidan tayinlangan tomonidan ochildi Hokim, Ser Xamfri Gibbs, 9 iyun kuni.[1] Birinchi marta Rodeziyada rasmiy shaxs bor edi Muxolifat lideri kim qora edi: Josiya Gondo Birlashgan Xalq partiyasining rahbari, endi Qonunchilik Assambleyasida Smit va oq tanli RF qarshisida o'tirdi.[45] Gibbs Rodeziyadagi Britaniya tojini vakili bo'lishiga qaramay, u umrining aksariyat qismida mahalliy aholisi bo'lgan va har ikkala lagerda ham oyoqlari bo'lgan, o'zini ham Rodeziyaga, ham uzoq monarxga sodiq deb bilgan.[46] Parlamentni ochar ekan, u Assambleyada RFning mustahkamlangan ko'pchiligi "mamlakatni to'liq mustaqilligiga olib borish vakolatiga" ega ekanligini aytdi, keyinroq u buni "bizning mustaqilligimiz" deb atadi.[1]

Olti qavatli Edvardiya binosi o'rtacha kunda turadi, uning ustida bayroq ko'tariladi.
Rodeziya uyi koloniya idorasi edi Oliy komissar Londonda. (2006 yil fotosurat)

Keyin Gibbs Rodeziya qo'shnilari bilan iloji boricha eng yaxshi munosabatlarni o'rnatishni istayotganini aytdi va Britaniyalik kuzatuvchilarni hayratda qoldirdi: hukumat unga yaqinda bo'lib o'tgan muzokaralar paytida Portugaliya tomonidan berilgan tavsiyalarga amal qilishini va o'z shaxsiy imkoniyatlarini ochishini aytgan. diplomatik vakolatxona Portugaliya poytaxtida Lissabon amaliy bo'lishi bilanoq. Evan Kempbell, Rodeziya Oliy komissar Londonda Uайтxoldan o'sha kuni Garri Ridmanning Rodeziya lavozimiga tayinlanishini tasdiqlashni so'radi "akkreditatsiyadan o'tgan vakil "Portugaliyaga, 1957 yildagi Federatsiya buni amalga oshirishga imkon berganligi sababli, hali ham Rodosiyani printsip asosida qamrab olgan milliy merosxo'rlik.[1] 1963 yilda Sandisning niyat xati buni Rodeziya nazarida tasdiqladi.[11] Tarixchi JR T Vud buni "Rodeziyaning birinchi mustaqil va haqiqatan ham bir tomonlama harakati - shamoldagi haqiqiy somon" deb ataydi.[1]

Rodeziya motivatsiyasi

Luso-Rodeziya munosabatlarini mustahkamlashdan tashqari, Lissabonga tayinlash Afrika millatiga Buyuk Britaniyaning tashqarisida Evropada diplomatik o'rnini ta'minlash va Solsberiga qit'ada yangi savdo sheriklari va diplomatik ittifoqchilarini topishda yordam berish uchun mo'ljallangan edi. Boshqa narsalar bilan bir qatorda, Rodeziyaliklar e'lon qilinmagan ingliz-amerikalik qurol-aslahalar embargosi ​​tufayli kelib chiqqan harbiy texnika etishmovchiligini qoplashni niyat qilganlar. Immigratsiya va turizm bo'yicha sobiq vazir Ridman ham inglizlarning iste'fodagi zobiti edi Qirollik havo kuchlari (u bombardimonchilarni tadqiq qilishda ishtirok etgan) va tajribali muhandis va ishbilarmon: hukumat o'ylaganidek, Evropaning samolyotlari, qurol-yarog 'va boshqa jihozlarini manbai bo'lgan, shuningdek, materik Evropada Rodeziya manfaatlarini himoya qiladigan barcha kerakli ingredientlar. .[1]

Lord Brokvey, boshlig'i Mustamlaka erkinligi uchun harakat, Rodeziya o'zini tasdiqlamoqchi bo'lganiga ishongan amalda Lissabon masalasida qasddan Britaniyaga qarshi chiqish orqali xalqaro hamjamiyat oldida mustaqillik. "Agar Solsberiga chet el poytaxtlarida diplomatik huquqlarni talab qilishga ruxsat berilsa, uning suverenitetini tasdiqlash qabul qilinadi", deb yozgan u inglizlar uchun maqolasida demokratik sotsialistik haftalik Tribuna.[37]

Britaniya rad etadi

Buyuk Britaniya Kempbellning iltimosiga binoan tayyor bo'lmasdan ushlanib qoldi va bir haftadan beri hech qanday javob bermadi. Bu orada, nafaqaga chiqishi kerak bo'lgan Kempbell, 10 iyun kuni Rodeziya hukumati tomonidan bo'shatildi. Uning o'rnini egallagan brigadir Endryu Skin, Kempbellning Londondagi ofisini egallab oldi Rodeziya uyi, 429 Strand olti kundan keyin.[47]

Ridman sarmoyasini tezda ta'minlashga intilib, Rodeziya hukumati 19 iyun kuni Angliya va Portugaliyaning ma'qullashiga binoan Ridman etti kun ichida tayinlanishi haqida ommaga ma'lum qildi. Uaytxoll hali ham hech qanday choralar ko'rmadi. Uilson va uning Hamdo'stlik aloqalari bo'yicha davlat kotibi, Artur Bottomley, egallab olingan Shashka, Buyuk Britaniya bosh vazirining mamlakatdagi rasmiy qarorgohi, ular Hamdo'stlik davlatlari rahbarlarini mehmon qilishgan.[48]

Bottomli yo'qligida uning idorasi ushbu masalani o'rganib chiqdi va Rodeziya Janubiy Afrikadagi vakolatini saqlab qolishi mumkin, ammo Lissabonda boshqasini tayinlashiga yo'l qo'yilmasligi kerak; a konsul maqbul edi, deya xulosa qilishdi ular, lekin faqat Britaniya elchixonasi xodimlarining bir qismi sifatida. Bottomley ushbu taraqqiyot haqida 25 iyun kuni o'z ofisidan qo'ng'iroq qilguniga qadar bilmas edi, shuning uchun u hali ham hech narsa qilmadi. Kutishni istamagan Rodeziya ertasi kuni Ridman tayinlanganligini tasdiqladi va bu Uilsonning g'azabiga sabab bo'ldi. Faqat endi Bottomley nihoyat harakatga keltirildi; u vazirlik xulosalari to'g'risida 29 iyunda Solsberiga xabar berib, ularga elchixonadagi konsulni taklif qildi, ammo mustaqil idorani sanktsiyalashdan bosh tortdi.[49]

Dastlabki muzokaralar

Rodeziyalik umidsizlik; Buyuk Britaniya kechiktirish taktikasini qo'llaydi

Garold Uilsonning portret fotosurati
Buyuk Britaniya bosh vaziri Garold Uilson olib kelishi mumkinligiga ishongan Yan Smit uni toshbo'ron qilib, tovoniga.

Buyuk Britaniya va Rodeziya o'rtasidagi mustaqillik bo'yicha muzokaralar Reidman tayinlanishiga katta ishora qilmasdan ikki hafta davomida davom etdi va Britaniya ehtimoliy Rodeziyani muhokama qilish bilan ko'proq shug'ullandi. mustaqillikni bir tomonlama e'lon qilish (UDI).[50] Smit 30 iyun kuni o'z parlamentida ochiqchasiga qarshilik ko'rsatuvchi nutq so'zladi va Buyuk Britaniyaning Afrikadagi siyosatiga asossiz ta'sir ko'rsatayotgan Hamdo'stlikning yangi a'zolari bilan ishlash uchun Britaniyaga hujum qildi.[51] Angliya tashkilotning parchalanishiga olib keladigan xalqaro xo'rlikdan qochishni juda xohlagan edi, deydi u va shuning uchun unchalik taniqli bo'lmagan a'zolarni tinchlantirish orqali uni birlashtirmoqchi edi. Bosh vazir o'zining nafratlanishini aniq aytib, muzokaralarni davom ettirishga va'da berib, Angliya o'zining taniqli yo'nalishini haqiqatan ham qo'llab-quvvatlashiga ishonmasligini aytdi.[51]

Ko'chmas Smit bilan muomala qilishda Uilsonning vazirlari qasddan umidsizlik va kechikish dasturini qabul qildilar: Angliya Rodeziya bosh vazirini to'satdan toshbo'ron qilib, davom etayotgan muzokaralarning tashqi ko'rinishini vaqti-vaqti bilan takrorlab, o'zlarining pozitsiyalarini takrorlaydi va Smit ham orqaga qaytadi, degan umidda. yoki uning kabineti oxir-oqibat uning muzokaralar olib boradigan mahoratiga bo'lgan ishonchini yo'qotadi va uni yumshoqroq odam bilan almashtiradi.[11] Vudning ta'kidlashicha, Uilson, Bottomli va ularning leyboristlar zamondoshlari "o'zlarining siyosiy kunlari bilan chalg'itilgan",[28] va shu paytgacha Rodeziyaning Angliyadan ancha ko'ngli qolganini tushunmadim. Keyinchalik Xuggins sharhlaganidek, "Hamdo'stlikdan chiqarib yuborildi".[52] Solsberida qal'a mentaliteti rivojlanib, uni bir tomonlama harakatga undadi. Vud Britaniyaning ushbu toshbo'ron qilish taktikasini saqlab turishi noto'g'ri baholangan deb xulosa qildi va Rodeziya hukumatining begonalashish hissini yanada kuchaytirdi.[28]

Inglizlarda Lordlar palatasi 26-iyul kuni Brokvey bosdi Lord Teylor, Davlat kotibining mustamlakalar bo'yicha muovini, Rodeziyaning da'volariga ko'ra, Lissabonga uchrashuvga to'sqinlik qilmaslik tan olish bilan teng bo'ladi amalda Rodeziyani mustaqil davlat sifatida tan olish. Teylorning javobi shuki, Buyuk Britaniya Rodeziyaning xorijdagi aloqalari bo'yicha yakuniy huquqni himoya qilishga sodiq qoldi. Keyin Brokvey, Rodeziya Pretoriyadagi mustaqil idorasiga qanday erishganligini so'radi; shubhasiz, uning so'zlariga ko'ra, bu "juda xavfli bo'lgan pretsedentmi?"[53] Teylor Pretoriya va Solsberi 1961 yilda Janubiy Afrika Hamdo'stlikdan chiqishidan oldin Oliy komissarlar bilan almashgan va Angliya Pretoriya missiyasini saqlab qolish uchun Rodeziyaga maxsus dispanser bergan deb javob berdi. Uning ta'kidlashicha, Britaniyaning nazarida bu Lissabon uchun namuna bo'lmadi.[53]

Buyuk Britaniya Kledvin Xuzni Rodeziyaga jo'natadi, 22-27 iyul

Inglizlar o'zlarining Hamdo'stlik vazirlaridan birini iyul oyining boshlarida Rodeziyaga muzokaralar o'tkazish uchun jo'natishga qaror qildilar, ammo bu Bottomli yoki uning o'rinbosari bo'ladimi-yo'qmi, bir muncha vaqt bahslashdi, Kledvin Xyuz, kim yuborilishi kerak. Uilson Rodosiya o'zining asosiy milliy bayramida mustaqilligini e'lon qilishi mumkinligi haqidagi mish-mishlarni eshitganligi sababli, buni dolzarb masala deb bildi. Rodos kuni (o'sha yili 12 iyulda), ammo bu yolg'on edi. 15 iyulda Buyuk Britaniyaning Rodeziya Oliy komissari, John Baines Johnston, Solsberida Smit va Xyuz o'rtasida bir hafta davom etadigan muzokaralar turini taklif qilishni buyurdilar. Agar Rodeziya bosh vaziri Bottomli bilan uchrashishni talab qilsa, Jonsonga g'orga ruxsat berildi, ammo bu zaruriy isbotlanmadi: Smit 18-kuni Xyuzning tashrifini qabul qildi. Buyuk Britaniya delegatsiyasi to'rt kundan keyin Solsberiga etib keldi.[54]

Muhokamalar hafta davomida tez sur'atlarda davom etdi, ammo Xyuz va Jonson bosh vazir o'rinbosari Smit bilan uchrashgan beshinchi kungacha, 26 iyulga qadar, Lissabon masalasiga tegmadi. Klifford Dupont va savdo va sanoat vaziri Jorj Rudland. Dyupon munozarani Sandisning 1963 yildagi bayonotiga asoslanib ochdi, unda Rodeziya hukumati Federatsiyaga ilgari berilgan har qanday huquqni saqlab qoladi, deb aytdi, Dupont, agar u Britaniyani xabardor qilsa, 1957 yilda chet elda o'z agentlarini tayinlash qobiliyatini o'z ichiga olgan. Portugaliya Rodeziya diplomatini qabul qilishga tayyorligini bildirganidek, Dupontning ta'kidlashicha, Rodeziya hukumati o'z huquqlari doirasida mukammal harakat qilmoqda.[55]

Xyuz 1957 yildagi hujjat Rodeziyaga Buyuk Britaniyadan rozi bo'lmasdan chet elda o'z vakolatxonasini tuzish huquqini berganiga ishonmasligiga qarshi chiqdi. Ridmanning tayinlanishi, ehtimol xalqaro miqyosda Rodeziya diplomatik obro'sining katta ko'tarilishi sifatida qaralishi va Britaniyaning obro'siga putur etkazishi mumkin, bu esa o'z navbatida mustaqillik uchun olib borilayotgan muzokaralarni har ikki tomon uchun ham qiyinlashtirishi mumkin edi. U Bottomlining Buyuk Britaniya elchixonasi xodimlariga konsul taklif qilishini ilgari takrorladi va mansabdor shaxsning elchixonada jismoniy joylashishi shart emasligini va agar u nominal ravishda unga bog'liq bo'lsa, boshqa joyda o'z idorasini ochishi mumkinligini aytdi.[55]

Smitning so'zlariga ko'ra, Rodeziya Uaytxollni xabardor qilib turishi kerak edi, ammo britaniyaliklarning oldindan kelishuvi shart emas edi; agar Angliya bunga qarshi chiqqan bo'lsa, dedi Bosh vazir, demak 1957 yildagi ishonib topshirish hech qachon hech narsani anglatmagan. Keyin Dupont Rodeziya missiyasi Buyuk Britaniya elchixonasining shunchaki yordamchi konsulligi bo'lishi kerak degan fikrni rad etib, yana gapirdi. Xyuz qat'iy ravishda 1957 yildagi jo'natma Rodeziyaliklarga tashqi masalalarda erkinlik bermaganiga qat'iy javob berdi va agar ular til topishmoqchi bo'lsa, yanada moslashuvchan bo'lishlari kerakligini ogohlantirdi.[55] Ochiq to'qnashuvdan qochmoqchi bo'lgan Smit Dyupontga ohangini qayta ko'rib chiqishini aytdi va mavzuni o'zgartirdi.[28]

Xyuz 27 iyul kuni kechqurun ketishdan oldin boshqa bir necha Rodeziya arboblari bilan uchrashdi, ammo Lissabon ko'pincha dasturdan tashqarida qoldi. Xyuz ketishi arafasida Dyupon Ridman 1 avgustda Lissabonda ish boshlashi va uni Portugaliya hukumati "iliq kutib olishi" haqida bayonot tarqatdi. Xyuz buni Smitga qisqa telefon orqali qo'ng'iroq qilish bilan rad etdi, ammo o'sha kuni kechqurun Rodeziyadan ketishdan oldin ko'proq narsa qila oldi.[56] 29 iyulda Smit matbuotdan savollar bilan murojaat qildi, Lissabon va umuman mustaqillik muzokaralariga izoh berdi. U Rodeziya mustaqillik sari ilgariroq bo'lganidan ko'ra ko'proq mustaqillik sari erishganiga ishonch bildirdi, lekin buni faqatgina Uilsonning Xyuzga bergan takliflariga bergan javobi, agar bu haqiqatan ham haqiqat bo'lsa, buni ko'rsatib beradi. Uning so'zlariga ko'ra, Uaytxoll mustaqillik masalasini hal qilishga intilgan bo'lsa-da, ularning yo'nalishi o'zgarganiga ishonmayman. U o'zi va RF o'z pozitsiyalarini hech qanday o'zgartirmasligini e'lon qildi. Lissabon mavzusiga o'tib, Smit bu mustaqillik mojarosidan alohida ekanligini ta'kidladi, keyin Dyuponning ikki kun oldin e'lon qilganini bekor qildi: Reidman tayinlanishi qo'shimcha xabar kelguniga qadar vaqtinchalik bo'lib qoladi, dedi u.[57]

Angliya-Rodeziya dushmanligi yanada chuqurlashadi

Bottomley G'arbiy Afrikaga sayohat qilib, Rodeziyada shubha uyg'otdi

Bottomli avgust oyining boshlarida G'arbiy Afrikani aylanib chiqdi va Gana va Nigeriyada bir necha marotaba nutq so'zlab, mezbonlarni zudlik bilan ko'pchilik hukmronligi Rodeziya mustaqilligi uchun so'zsiz talab ekanligiga ishontirdi. U Rodeziya UDI bo'lgan taqdirda harbiy kuch ishlatishni istisno qildi va buning o'rniga iqtisodiy isyonga qarshi bunday isyonni tugatishga va'da berdi. Bottomleyning kuch ishlatishni rad etishi tanqidga sabab bo'ldi Joshua Nkomo, marksist-leninchilarning qamoqdagi rahbari Zimbabve Afrika xalqlari ittifoqi Bu Britaniyaning boshqa afrikalik mol-mulkiga ega bo'lganligi sababli Rodeziyani dekolonizatsiya qilishda jiddiy emasligini ko'rsatdi.[58] Ayni paytda, Bottomleyning izohlari inglizlarga qarshi kayfiyatni kuchaytirdi. Smit o'z esdaliklarida Britaniyani "qulaylik va xotirjamlik siyosatiga murojaat qilganlikda" ayblab, kayfiyatni to'g'ridan-to'g'ri ifodalaydi.[59] "Biz kutdik va kutdik ... [lekin] inglizlar aniq qaror qabul qilishga tayyor emas edilar", deb yozadi u; "ular bizga javob berishdan oldin bankrot va kommunistik diktaturalar bilan maslahatlashishgan."[59] Rodeziya hukumatining taraqqiy etmaganligi tufayli g'azablanib, UDIga olib boradigan yo'lni ular uchun yagona yo'l deb bilishni boshladilar. Ammo Lissabon ziddiyatning bevosita suyagi bo'lib qoldi va bu masalada rodeziyaliklar bir dyuym bermaslikka qat'iy qaror qilishdi.[58]

18 avgust kuni Jonston va Smit o'rtasidagi uchrashuv

Yan Smitning portret fotosurati
Rodeziya Bosh vaziri Yan Smit Britaniya rad etgan Lissabon masalasini hal qilish uchun huquqiy arbitrajni taklif qildi.

Smit 18 avgust kuni soat 09: 00dan boshlab Djonont bilan uchrashuv tashkil etdi va u erda Dupont, bir nechta yuridik maslahatchilar va Rodeziya Oliy sudi sudyasi yordamida Lissabonga tayinlanish masalasini keng ko'rib chiqqanligi to'g'risida Buyuk Britaniya Oliy komissariga xabar berdi. . Sudya tegishli hujjatlarni o'rganib chiqdi va Dyuponning ularni sharhlashi to'g'ri degan xulosaga keldi. Shuning uchun Smit Portugaliya kelishgan ekan, Ridmanning tayinlanishi qonuniy ekaniga amin edi. Uzoq tortishuv boshlandi, biron bir odam jim turishni xohlamadi. Smit har doim moslashuvchan va fuqarolik bilan harakat qilganini, ammo u va uning hukumati o'zlarining pozitsiyasini bildirishlari kerakligini his qilishganini aytdi. Smit Lissabonga ularning taklif qilingan vakilining aniq mohiyatini tushuntirib, Britaniyani ularning niyatlari to'g'risida xabardor qilib, Rodeziyaliklar har qanday qonuniy majburiyatni bajarganligini aytdi.[58]

Jonston Smitning argumentini rad etdi va Federatsiya ham, Rodeziya ham hech qachon bunday tayinlashni amalga oshirmaganligini ta'kidladi (bu aslida yolg'on edi; Federal hukumat Janubiy Afrika va Portugaliyaning Mozambikida mustaqil diplomatik vakolatxonalarini ochgan va Rodeziya ikkalasini ham saqlab qolgan).[60] Jonson Rodeziya xalqaro mavqeini muddatidan oldin oshirishga harakat qilmoqda degan xulosaga keldi. Oldingi topshiriqlar, uning so'zlariga ko'ra, Uaytxollning yakuniy vakolatiga bo'ysungan holda Buyuk Britaniya va Rodeziya bilan hamkorlik qilishga imkon berish uchun qilingan va tashqi ishlar sohasida, xususan, uning tanlagan yo'nalishi Buyuk Britaniyaga zid bo'lsa, Rodeziyaga huquqini bermagan. Smitni qo'rqitmoqchi bo'lgan Jonston, nima uchun Rodeziya Bosh vaziri Britaniyaga qasddan qarshilik ko'rsatish orqali katta xalqaro voqeani keltirib chiqarishi mumkinligi to'g'risida qat'iy so'radi; Smit bunga javoban Britaniyaning o'tgan bir yarim yil ichida Rodeziyaga qarshi bir nechta g'alayonlaridan so'ng, Solsberi boshqasini qabul qilmasligini aytdi. Keyinroq suhbat shu tarzda davom etdi. Smit tegishli hujjatlarni ikkita sudya, bir nafari ingliz va bir rodeziyalik birgalikda ko'rib chiqishni taklif qildi, ammo Jonston buni rad etdi. Uchrashuv kelishuvsiz yakunlandi.[60]

Bottomley Britaniyaga qaytadi

Rodeziya matbuoti avgust oyining ikkinchi yarmida Lissabondagi ziddiyatlar to'g'risida ko'p yozgan, umuman Britaniya ham, Portugaliya ham, Rodeziya ham orqaga qaytmasligini bashorat qilgan. Aksariyat muxbirlar Uaytxoll kuchli chiziqni egallashiga ishongan bo'lsa-da, ozgina odamlar Ridmanni lavozimiga kirishishining oldini olishning har qanday usulini ko'rishlari mumkin edi.[61] 20 avgustda Bottomli o'zining so'nggi konferentsiyasida so'zga chiqdi Lagos va Britaniyaning Rodeziyaga nisbatan pozitsiyasi to'g'risida avval aytganlarini takrorladi. Uch kundan keyin Londonga qaytib, u Lissabonga nisbatan avvalgi pozitsiyasini yana bir bor tasdiqladi va u erda Buyuk Britaniyaning elchixonasi tarkibida rodeziyalik bo'lishidan mamnun bo'lishini aytdi, ammo boshqa ruxsat bermaydi. Xuddi shu intervyusida u Solsberini iqtisodiy oqibatlar haqida ogohlantirish orqali Uilson o'tgan yil oktyabr oyida Rodeziya UDI'sini oldi degan ishonchni bildirdi.[62] Gapirish Gwelo 27 avgustda Smit ushbu bayonotni mazax qildi va uni "aql bovar qilmaydigan" deb atadi.[61] Uning so'zlariga ko'ra, uning ma'muriyati hatto mustaqillik e'lon qilish haqida o'ylamagan, ammo u bu haqda hozir o'ylab topilgan va Angliya-Rodeziya munosabatlari eng past darajadagi darajaga etganiga ishongan. U Britaniyani tezda savdolashish stoliga qaytishga chaqirdi.[61]

Buyuk Britaniya uchrashuvni blokirovka qilishga urinmoqda

Uilson Portugaliyaga qarshi kurashishga qaror qildi

Inglizlar Smitni to'xtatish siyosatini davom ettirdilar. 1965 yil avgust oyi oxirida ular Rodeziya UDI ni zudlik bilan tahdid deb hisoblamadilar va shu sababli koloniyaning Ridman va Lissabonga nisbatan ona mamlakatiga qarshi doimiy ravishda bo'ysunmasligiga e'tibor qaratishdi. 30 avgustda Jonson Buyuk Britaniyaning Bottomleyning Hamdo'stlik bilan aloqalar bo'yicha idorasining bu masaladagi pozitsiyasini sarhisob qildi. According to his understanding, he said, Rhodesia had been told just before Federal dissolution that it would retain the Federation's former powers regarding external affairs, but that this entrustment was subject to British discretion, and could not be exercised without extensive prior consultation and conformity to Britain's line.[11]

Johnston rued bitterly that the Rhodesians had apparently made practical arrangements for an independent office in Lisbon anyway, even going to the trouble of renting the prospective mission premises. He repeated the claim he had made in the meeting with Smith on 18 August, saying once more that the Federal government had not made appointments off its own bat. He accepted that there was an independent Rhodesian envoy in Pretoria, but argued that this was the result of South Africa's enforced withdrawal from the Commonwealth. He did not mention the Rhodesian (formerly Federal) office in Lourenço Marques, which Wood comments could be considered "precedent for Portugal".[11]

On 5 September, the Salisbury Sunday Mail reported that Smith was standing firm on Reedman's absolute independence in Lisbon, and that Portugal had accepted the envoy.[11] Inglizlar Tashqi ishlar vaziri Maykl Styuart reacted with alarm, convening an urgent meeting the same day with Hughes and Sir Archibald Ross, Britain's ambassador to Portugal. Here Hughes proposed hauling Portugal over the coals, insisting that the Lisbon mission represented "creeping independence" for Rhodesia, and therefore had to be stopped.[63]

Ross disagreed, reasoning this would only damage relations between Britain and Portugal, an undesirable prospect given the countries' common membership in NATO, the European Free Trade Association and more.[63] There was much at stake; Britain enjoyed an annual £ 48 million savdo profitsiti with Portugal, and Portugaliya temir yo'llari was in the process of buying 50 teplovozlar dan Inglizcha elektr. In Azor orollari archipelago, Portugal provided NATO with a strategically key air base, which was unprotected by treaty; given the inclination, Lisbon might close it.[64]

Hughes insisted that there was nothing more they could do to deter Rhodesia directly; they had already threatened to expel Rhodesia's representative from the British Embassy in Washington, with no effect. The only open course therefore had to be to take a firmer line with Portugal. Two days later, on 7 September, Wilson discussed the matter with Hughes and Stewart, and agreed with their conclusions, telling them to proceed.[63]

Meeting between Johnston and Smith on 8 September; the appointment is confirmed

The same day, Bottomley wrote to Smith, saying that he and Wilson were disheartened by the lack of progress regarding both independence and the Lisbon appointment. He was willing to visit Rhodesia personally, but could not come until October because he had to be in "Blekpul" ishtirok etish Leyboristlar partiyasining konferentsiyasi, due to commence on 26 September.[63] The next morning, on 8 September, Johnston told Smith that if Reedman proceeded to Portugal in open disregard for Britain's wishes, it would negatively affect future independence negotiations. Rhodesia's delay in justifying the appointment was also having a detrimental affect, Johnston asserted. Finally, he threatened to evict the Rhodesian envoys from Washington, Bonn and Tokyo if Rhodesia did not desist. Smith was yet again unmoved. Any procrastination regarding Lisbon was Britain's fault, he insisted. He told Johnston to wait for the afternoon session in Rhodesia's Legislative Assembly to hear Dupont's official announcement of Reedman's appointment, as well as the full Rhodesian explanation behind it.[65]

Smith said he understood this would irk the British, but insisted that he and his government were no longer willing to wait. He had repeatedly offered to respect the judgement of an impartial arbitration team, he reminded Johnston, but the British had shot this idea down each time. He therefore felt compelled to follow the advice given by his own legal team, which was that the appointment was legitimate. His government would not accept a lesser appointment in Lisbon than in Pretoria and Lourenço Marques. He dismissed Johnston's threat to expel the Rhodesian representatives in West Germany, Japan and America; relations with Portugal and South Africa were far more important, he said, as they were Rhodesia's two closest neighbours geographically.[65]

Johnston protested that the British government could not take part in the kind of judicial enquiry Smith described, as its sovereignty could not be subject to any outside judgement and there was nothing to arbitrate anyway. Smith was again resolute: why, he queried, was Whitehall so adamant to avoid legal arbitration if its ministers were so sure they were right? He promised to drop the matter if such a panel ruled against him, but to no avail. Johnston said only that he would telegraph Whitehall to inform them that Reedman's appointment was imminent. Dupont confirmed it that afternoon, telling the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly that the mission had been accepted by Portugal.[65][66]

Britain mobilises NATO support against Portugal; Lisbon insists it is neutral

Kostyum, palto va ko'zoynak taqib olgan kulrang sochli janob bir oz oldinga egilib, o'qdan tashqarida bo'lgan narsaga qaraydi.
Portugaliya bosh vaziri António de Oliveira Salazar was a firm supporter of the Rhodesian government,[67] but propagated a line of neutrality.

Meanwhile, Stewart and Ross argued with Nogueira and the Portuguese muvaqqat ishlar vakili in London, José Manuel de Villas-Boas de Vasconcellos Faria. On 8 September, Nogueira said the Portuguese were accepting Reedman as a Rhodesian representative, but were not defining his status as they wished to remain neutral in what they regarded as an exclusively Anglo-Rhodesian problem. So far as he could see, Nogueira said, Portugal had done no harm to British interests. Stewart firmly told Nogueira that Britain expected Portugal to make a statement within 24 hours saying that it would not deal with Reedman while he remained off the British Embassy staff. Nogueira replied that his government was not going to accord official diplomatic recognition to Reedman, and that Dupont understood this.[65] Ross now threatened to involve NATO if Portugal did not thoroughly explain its conduct. Unmoved, Nogueira said this surprised him; if the British were so keen to have Reedman on the staff at their embassy, he answered, that was down to them. Portugal was totally neutral in the affair, he insisted.[64]

Britain vigorously rallied other NATO countries to take a stand against Portugal over Reedman.[68] France warned that NATO pressure was unlikely to yield results in his matter, but Belgium's NATO representative, André de Staercke, agreed to challenge Salazar on 11 September.[64] At his meeting with de Staercke, Salazar denied that Portugal was giving Rhodesia its own diplomatic representation, and said there had been some misunderstanding. Portugal would not obstruct Reedman's entry should he arrive, Salazar said, as he was travelling on a (Rhodesian-issued) Britaniya pasporti.[69] On 14 September, Nogueira's ministry released a statement saying that if Britain challenged Portugal over Rhodesia at NATO, Lisbon would "use the greatest firmness to repel any attempt to attribute particular responsibilities or to make criticism of Portugal's position".[70]

Britain raised the issue formally in the Shimoliy Atlantika kengashi, NATO's most senior political governing body, the same day. Here Portugal's delegate, Vasco da Cunha, argued that given the standing existence of independent Rhodesian offices in Lourenço Marques, Pretoria and London,[n 8] the matter was between Britain and Rhodesia, and not Portugal's business. Rhodesia had simply asked to have Reedman head a representative office in Lisbon, and he would not present a letter of accreditation. If Rhodesia had exaggerated this, da Cunha said, that was not Portugal's concern. The Italian, Belgian, Danish, French and U.S. delegates in turn sided with Britain, and collectively asked da Cunha to tell his government to publicly declare its non-acceptance of Reedman while he lacked British approval. Da Cunha refused, saying this would only irritate his compatriots "because of the neglect by their allies of their interests in the past".[69] The meeting broke up without agreement. Whitehall was pleased with the pro-British sentiment displayed therein,[69] while Lisbon remained unmoved.[68]

Uchrashuv

Reedman arrives in Lisbon and receives Portuguese approval

Barokko uslubida bezatilgan pushti-oq bino quyoshli kunda old tomondan tasvirlangan.
The Necessidadlar saroyi yilda Lissabon, the seat of Portugal's Tashqi Ishlar Vazirligi, where Reedman presented his letter of accreditation to Nogueira (1997 photograph)

Having spent the previous week in London, Reedman flew into Lissabon Portela aeroporti on 15 September 1965. He was met there by the Portuguese Foreign Ministry's assistant chief of protocol, Luis Quartim Bastos, and three Rhodesian officials, who had arrived a fortnight before. Nobody from the British Embassy was present. Bastos told a reporter that he was at the airport on Nogueira's behalf to accord Reedman "the classic welcome for the arrival of heads of mission".[70] Speaking the next day, Reedman appeared genial and optimistic. "We [Portugal and Rhodesia] have everything in common," he said, "including the will for survival, an awareness of the true situation overseas, and a greater feeling towards what we are doing."[70]

Two days later, Dupont announced that he had issued a letter of accreditation to Reedman for presentation to Nogueira. The envoy would not present ishonch yorliqlari, Dupont explained, as he was representing the Rhodesian government, and not its davlat rahbari, Qirolicha Yelizaveta II. The Deputy Prime Minister expressed confusion regarding the appointment's discussion at NATO, saying that Rhodesia was far outside the organisation's geographical area of responsibility. He said that the letter of accreditation would confer on Reedman the title of "Accredited Diplomatic Representative", and that Reedman would thereafter head the "Rhodesian Diplomatic Mission" in Lisbon, which would operate on the same level as the Rhodesian office in Pretoria. The Portuguese Foreign Ministry quickly issued a statement correcting Dupont's wording, saying that Reedman would lead the "Rhodesian Mission", with no reference to diplomatic status.[71]

To Britain's alarm and indignation, the Portuguese government announced on 21 September that Nogueira had accepted "a letter of introduction" from Reedman, conferring upon him the title "Chief of the Rhodesian Mission", with powers to deal with the Portuguese Foreign Ministry in Luso-Rhodesian matters without British interference. This followed the precedent set by Reedman's counterpart in South Africa, the statement said.[72] Speaking publicly in Salisbury the same evening, Dupont told reporters that there had never been any intention to claim ambassadorial status for Reedman, and that Rhodesia had constantly kept Britain informed of what was happening regarding the appointment. So far as he was concerned, he said, the Rhodesian government had achieved its objective of attaining an independent diplomatic representative in Portugal, and had not exceeded its mandate in any way while doing so.[73] Britain protested strenuously, saying Portugal was going back on its word.[72] Portugal insisted that its reception of Reedman and his Lisbon mission did not prejudice Britain's responsibility over Rhodesia, and was justified because of the long-standing ties between Portugal and Rhodesia, as well as their common involvement in many southern African issues.[74]

Rhodesia initiates clandestine arms purchases

Reedman carried instructions from Salisbury to spend up to £3 million on European weapons, aircraft and equipment as soon as he could. The Rhodesian government now believed that it would almost certainly declare independence unilaterally and, knowing the purchase of materiel would be more difficult following this, wished to have the Rodeziya xavfsizlik kuchlari ' necessary ammunition, weapons, spare parts and other equipment in place beforehand. Soon after arriving in Portugal, Reedman contacted the Lisbon-based Zoio brothers, José, Luiz and Jean, who had recently supplied the Portugaliya qurolli kuchlari in Angola with British-made weapons in direct contravention of NATO's embargo against arming Portugal's African-based troops. The Zoios were interested in stocking Rhodesia's arsenal, and promptly agreed to arrange an order of weapons from a third party on Reedman's behalf in exchange for a akkreditiv from the Rhodesian government.[69]

Pretending their client was the government of Pakistan, the Zoio brothers contacted a licensed arms dealer from England, Major W R L Turp MBE ning Bexli, Kent, who quickly agreed in principle, requesting a letter of credit from a Jeneva bank and appropriate oxirgi foydalanuvchi sertifikatlari for the weapons.[75] Meanwhile, Reedman's harbiy attashe, Wing Commander John Mussell, travelled to Belgium to buy starter cartridges for the Rolls-Royce Avon 109 jet engines used by the Rodeziya qirollik havo kuchlari "s Inglizcha elektr kanberra bombers, as well as engines for Rhodesia's Hawker Hunter jet fighters, which were produced in Belgium under licence from Britain.[69]

Reedman speaks on Portuguese state radio, 24 September

I have a mandate from the Rhodesian government to put our case for independence not only to the people of Portugal, in order to obtain your understanding and support of our just, urgent, and proper claims, but to all those people who are interested in the cause of justice ....

Harry Reedman speaks on Emissora Nacional, 24 September 1965[76][77]

On 24 September, Reedman appeared on Portugal's state-owned national radio station, Emissora Nacional de Radiodifusão, addressing the Portuguese nation as "head of the Rhodesian diplomatic mission to Portugal".[77] He spoke along lines reminiscent of Smith's speech to parliament on 30 June, saying the Afro-Asian element "made a mockery of the Commonwealth" and enabled Chinese-initiated communist encroachment into Africa.[77] More than one Commonwealth member state hosted training facilities for black communist guerrillas, he said, which threatened all "civilised states in Africa".[77] He dismissed one man, one vote as false "trash democracy",[77] and said that in the present geopolitical climate countries run by black Africans inevitably destroyed themselves. "This your Rhodesian neighbour will not in any circumstances allow," he pledged. "We [Portugal and Rhodesia] stand together in a common cause because of civilisation."[76]

Ross rebuked Nogueira for allowing the broadcast, saying its content was insidious and goading. Nogueira agreed that Reedman's words were provocative, but said Portugal could not be blamed as it did not censor public broadcasts. Britain considered withdrawing Ross in protest, but its Foreign Office ruled this out, saying Britain could not afford to be without an ambassador in Lisbon to influence Portugal's actions in the event of UDI. British Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend rejected this view, pointing to Lisbon's conduct regarding Reedman, which he said showed the Portuguese "ha[d] very clearly made up their minds" to support a Rhodesian UDI.[76] The British ambassador would not be able to affect matters, he surmised, and British interests would be better served by immediately taking a firm hand against Portugal, in the hope that this would send a strong message to Rhodesia.[76] Ross then protested to the Portuguese about Reedman's calling himself "head of the Rhodesian diplomatic mission" on the radio; Lisbon replied impassively that this was a private expression of views by Reedman, and not Portugal's responsibility.[78]

Natijada

Final steps to UDI

Asosiy maqola: Rodeziyaning bir tomonlama mustaqillik deklaratsiyasi

While the British remained firmly against separate Rhodesian representation in Lisbon, there was little they could do to stop it. Ross was nominally put on extended leave, but not withdrawn.[74] Deciding that he could no longer wait for Bottomley to fulfil his promise to visit Rhodesia during October, Smith resolved to instead meet with Wilson personally in London, and arranged to travel on 3 October, arriving the next day.[19] While Smith prepared to travel, Britain continued its frantic efforts to carry international anti-Rhodesian sentiment, among other things urging each NATO member government not to deal with Reedman.[79] In London, Britons who sympathised with Smith came out to support him in large numbers, surprising both the British and the Rhodesians.[80] The two Prime Ministers' talks were largely unproductive, and little common ground was found before Smith flew home on 12 October.[81]

Two weeks later, Wilson travelled to Salisbury to continue the talks.[82] The British Prime Minister proposed that future black representation in the Rhodesian parliament might be safeguarded by the revocation of some of Salisbury's self-governing powers, held since 1923. This was a horrific prospect in the eyes of his Rhodesian opponents,[82] and proved the final straw for Smith's government. The Mustaqillikning bir tomonlama deklaratsiyasi was signed by the Rhodesian Cabinet on 11 November 1965, to almost unanimous international acrimony.[83] Ertasi kuni Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Xavfsizlik Kengashi o'tdi Resolution 216, which condemned the declaration as an illegal one "made by a racist minority", and called on all member states to withhold diplomatik tan olish.[84]

Portugal's role in Rhodesian sanction-busting

Shuningdek qarang: Beyra patrul xizmati

Smith was confident that the British military would never agree to engage in what he said would be a "fratricidal war" against Rhodesia;[85] he was proven correct when a British Mudofaa vazirligi council, convened by Wilson and headed by Denis Xili, Mudofaa bo'yicha davlat kotibi, determined such intervention "impossible", citing various logistical problems, the danger of provoking a pre-emptive Rhodesian attack on Zambia, and the psychological issues that would surely accompany any confrontation between British and Rhodesian troops.[46] Wilson therefore put all his eggs in the sanctions basket, predicting in January 1966 that the embargo would bring Rhodesia to its knees "within a matter of weeks rather than months".[86] The UN embargo proved ineffective, largely because both Portugal and South Africa refused to participate.[46] Both declared themselves neutral in the Rhodesian affair, and continued to supply Rhodesia with vital resources such as oil, both at a governmental level and privately. Portugal provided the seaports of Mozambique and the oil refinery at Lourenço Marques.[85] Car stickers marked "obrigado moçambique"—"Thank You Mozambique"—quickly became popular with white Rhodesian motorists.[87]

Clandestine trade with other nations continued, initially at a reduced level; among other things, Portugal illicitly labelled unsold Rhodesian tobacco as Mozambican product, then sold it on Salisbury's behalf in Europe and Asia.[88] Through this and a series of similar sanction-busting operations Rhodesia avoided the economic cataclysm predicted by Wilson, and, with the help of South Africa and Portugal, gradually became more self-sufficient.[89] Aiming to directly cut off the main supply lines of oil to Rhodesia, namely the Portuguese Mozambican ports at Beyra and Lourenço Marques,[90] Wilson set up the Beyra patrul xizmati, a Qirollik floti squadron based in the Mozambik kanali, in March 1966. This blockade was endorsed the following month by UN Security Council Resolution 221. Too small to cover both Beira and Lourenço Marques, and unable to legally fire on tankers once they were in Portuguese waters, the patrol met with little success, but it endured regardless for nearly a decade.[91][n 9]

Yog'och zaxiraga ega bo'lgan FN FAL jangovar miltiq.
Belgiyalik FN FAL battle rifle was one of Rhodesia's primary small arms during the Bush urushi.

The Zoios' clandestine transaction with Turp initially progressed well, but fell apart in March 1966, when Turp discovered he would actually be arming Rhodesia rather than Pakistan, reacted with alarm and informed the British government. Inglizlar Savdo kengashi tightened its control over arms transactions, and encouraged its NATO counterparts to do the same, while the Zoios turned their attention to Belgian, Italian and West German arms dealers. In October 1966, a huge consignment of army and air force equipment arrived in Rhodesia from the seaports of Mozambique, with many of the containers bearing metropolitan Portuguese markings. Prominent among the European weapons were FN FAL battle rifles from Belgium,[75] which allowed an unofficial Rhodesian trade delegation to operate quietly in spite of the sanctions.[93]

Carnation Revolution ends Luso-Rhodesian cooperation

Rhodesia's Lisbon mission remained open throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, providing a key link between the Rhodesian and Portuguese governments, which remained close. When Rhodesia adopted a republican constitution in 1970, Portugal bowed to British diplomatic pressure and withdrew its consul-general, João de Freitas Cruz, from Salisbury, but the Rhodesian office in Lisbon remained open.[94] Bilan Chinnigullar inqilobi of 1974, Portugal's African policy was suddenly reversed. By contrast to the former authoritarian government, which had been committed to a pluricontinental Portugal, fighting costly wars against independence movements in its African territories to maintain it, the new leftist administration rapidly initiated moves to withdraw from Africa as quickly as possible. Following hurried negotiations between Portugal and the nationalist guerrillas in each territory, both Mozambique and Angola became independent under communist governments in 1975.[95] Lisbon's stance on Rhodesia altered accordingly. The Portuguese government ordered the closure of the Rhodesian mission in April 1975, and simultaneously withdrew its own remaining officials from Rhodesia. The Rhodesian mission in Lisbon formally closed on 1 May 1975.[96]

Izohlar va ma'lumotnomalar

Izohlar

  1. ^ Whitehall also had exclusive rights regarding alterations to the 1923 constitution, the British-appointed Hokim 's salary, and bills regarding native administration, mining revenues and railways. The British government never intervened regarding these issues, regarding its reserved powers over them as for exceptional cases only.[3] Sifatida Kler Palley comments, it would have been extremely difficult for Whitehall to enforce these kinds of powers, and attempting to do so would have been likely to cause a crisis.[4]
  2. ^ The act conferred on Salisbury the power "to appoint diplomatic agents, or consular or trade representatives, in countries which are willing to receive them, to deal with matters within the competence of the Federal Government".[1]
  3. ^ Southern Rhodesia's 1961 constitution, devised jointly with Britain, was designed to gradually increase the number of black Southern Rhodesians qualified to vote. It was adopted following the results of a general referendum.[19]
  4. ^ A prominent example of this, often cited by the Southern Rhodesians, related to the alleged actions and words of the British Bosh vazir o'rinbosari va Birinchi davlat kotibi R A Butler at a meeting just before the Victoria Falls Conference in June 1963. The then Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Uinston Fild and his deputy Yan Smit would claim that Butler promised them "independence no later than, if not before, the other two territories" in return for Salisbury's help in winding up the Federation,[21] "in view of your country's wonderful record of Responsible Government over the past forty years ... and above all the great loyalty you have always given to Britain in time of war".[22] There is no written record of this meeting and Butler would deny that he had ever said such a thing.[22]
  5. ^ Soon after Britain ceased its financial assistance, the United States halted its own smaller aid contributions to Rhodesia in June 1964.[27] When pressed on the subject in July 1965 by Rhodesia's finance minister, John Wrathall, Britaniya Cledwyn Hughes explained that the resumption of financial assistance would depend on progress towards an independence settlement acceptable to Britain. Neither Whitehall nor the British public would back economic aid to Rhodesia with the independence issue on rocky ground, he said, as Britain had financial difficulties of its own. Wrathall complained to no avail that Britain was still finding room in its tight budget to aid other countries, and Rhodesia resented being excluded.[28]
  6. ^ Joshua Nkomo olib keldi Zimbabve Afrika xalqlari ittifoqi (ZAPU), which was Marksist-leninchi and aligned with the Varshava shartnomasi, while the Reverend Ndabaningi sithole va Robert Mugabe were respectively chairman and party secretary of the Zimbabve Afrika milliy ittifoqi (ZANU), a Maoist party backed by the Xitoy Xalq Respublikasi va uning ittifoqchilari. Both ZANU and ZAPU were banned in Rhodesia on 26 August 1964, with Nkomo, Sithole, Mugabe and others detained indefinitely. The remaining leaders of ZANU and ZAPU thereupon moved their respective headquarters to Zambia. Nkomo, Sithole and Mugabe remained in prison until December 1974, when they were released in the run-up to the 1975 Victoria Falls Conference.[30]
  7. ^ The Rhodesian government convened a national indaba (tribal conference) in October 1964, inviting 622 black chiefs, headmen and other traditional representatives to Domboshawa, near Salisbury. Their unanimous backing of independence under the 1961 constitution was cited by Salisbury as evidence that the country's tribal population supported the government line. A month later a general mustaqillik referendumi of the mostly white electorate was held, which yielded an 89% "yes" vote.[33]
  8. ^ The London office da Cunha refers to here is the Rhodesian Oliy komissiya da Rhodesia House.[69]
  9. ^ Despite the patrol's futility—it intercepted only 47 tankers in its first five years, of which 42 were allowed to go on—Britain retained it, gradually reducing it in size, until 1975, when Mozambique became independent and pledged not to transship oil to Rhodesia.[92]

Adabiyotlar

  1. ^ a b v d e f g h men Wood 2005, p. 319
  2. ^ Wood 2005, p. 9
  3. ^ Rowland 1978, pp. 247–248
  4. ^ Palley 1966, p. 230
  5. ^ St Brides 1980
  6. ^ Berlyn 1978, pp. 134–142
  7. ^ a b Smith 1997, p. 32
  8. ^ a b v Wood 2005, p. 279
  9. ^ Smith 1997, p. 33
  10. ^ Wood 2005, pp. 319, 337
  11. ^ a b v d e f g Wood 2005, p. 344
  12. ^ Blake 1977, p. 331; Welensky 1964, p. 64
  13. ^ Jackson 1990, 96-97 betlar; Wood 2005, p. 20
  14. ^ Mazrui 1993, p. 495
  15. ^ Petter-Bowyer 2005, p. 75; Schwarz 2011, p. 371
  16. ^ Schwarz 2011, p. 370; Wood 2005, p. 99
  17. ^ Meredith 1984, p. 131
  18. ^ Blake 1977, p. 335
  19. ^ a b Wood 2005, pp. 360–363, 367
  20. ^ Wood 2005, p. 371
  21. ^ Berlyn 1978, p. 135
  22. ^ a b Wood 2005, p. 167
  23. ^ Wood 2005, p. 189
  24. ^ Wood 2005, p. 38
  25. ^ Berlyn 1978, pp. 131–132; Wessels 2010, 102-104-betlar
  26. ^ Wood 2005, 215-216-betlar
  27. ^ Wood 2005, p. 351
  28. ^ a b v d Wood 2005, p. 335
  29. ^ Wood 2005, pp. 101–103; Martin & Johnson 1981, 70-71 betlar
  30. ^ Binda 2008, p. 48; Cilliers 1984, p. 5; Wessels 2010, 102-103 betlar
  31. ^ Palley 1966, 742-73 betlar
  32. ^ a b Wessels 2010, pp. 89–90, 102–103
  33. ^ The Sydney Morning Herald 1964; Harris 1969; Berlyn 1978, pp. 144–146; Wessels 2010, p. 105
  34. ^ Smith 1997, p. 153
  35. ^ Wood 2005, pp. 418–420, 445; Wessels 2010, p. 105
  36. ^ Wood 2005, p. 325
  37. ^ a b Brockway 1965
  38. ^ a b v Fedorowich & Thomas 2001, pp. 184–187
  39. ^ Fedorowich & Thomas 2001, pp. 172–175, 185–186
  40. ^ Duignan & Gann 1994, pp. 12–14
  41. ^ Fedorowich & Thomas 2001, p. 177
  42. ^ Wood 2005, p. 352
  43. ^ Smith 1997, 72-73 betlar
  44. ^ Gale 1973, 88-89 betlar
  45. ^ Windrich 1978, p. 37
  46. ^ a b v Wood 2008, p. 6
  47. ^ Wood 2005, p. 320
  48. ^ Wood 2005, p. 323
  49. ^ Wood 2005, p. 326
  50. ^ Wood 2005, pp. 323–326
  51. ^ a b Wood 2005, pp. 326–327
  52. ^ Berlyn 1978, p. 143
  53. ^ a b House of Lords & 26 July 1965
  54. ^ Wood 2005, pp. 329–331
  55. ^ a b v Wood 2005, p. 334
  56. ^ Wood 2005, p. 337
  57. ^ Wood 2005, p. 338
  58. ^ a b v Wood 2005, 339-340-betlar
  59. ^ a b Smith 1997, 90-92 betlar
  60. ^ a b Wood 2005, pp. 340–341
  61. ^ a b v Wood 2005, p. 343
  62. ^ Wood 2005, p. 342
  63. ^ a b v d Wood 2005, p. 345
  64. ^ a b v Wood 2005, p. 347
  65. ^ a b v d Wood 2005, p. 346
  66. ^ Kapungu 1973, p. 10
  67. ^ Wessels 2010, 149-152 betlar
  68. ^ a b Fedorowich & Thomas 2001, p. 185
  69. ^ a b v d e f Wood 2005, p. 353
  70. ^ a b v The Glasgow Herald & 16 September 1965
  71. ^ Wood 2005, p. 355
  72. ^ a b Wood 2005, p. 357
  73. ^ The Glasgow Herald & 22 September 1965
  74. ^ a b Fedorowich & Thomas 2001, pp. 185–186
  75. ^ a b Wood 2008, 73-74-betlar
  76. ^ a b v d Wood 2005, p. 360
  77. ^ a b v d e The Glasgow Herald & 25 September 1965
  78. ^ Wood 2005, p. 361
  79. ^ Wood 2005, pp. 363–366
  80. ^ Wood 2005, pp. 381–383
  81. ^ Wood 2005, pp. 387–388
  82. ^ a b Wood 2005, pp. 412–414
  83. ^ Wood 2005, pp. 468–470; Wood 2008, p. 10; Wessels 2010, 116–118-betlar
  84. ^ UN Security Council 1965
  85. ^ a b Smith 1997, pp. 109–116
  86. ^ Wood 2008, p. 47
  87. ^ Arab Observer 1966, p. 33
  88. ^ Naylor 1999, p. 138
  89. ^ Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2008, p. 119
  90. ^ Smith 1997, 116–117-betlar
  91. ^ Mobley 2002, pp. 66, 71–76, 83
  92. ^ Mobley 2002, p. 79
  93. ^ Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2008, p. 122
  94. ^ St. Petersburg Times 1970
  95. ^ Cilliers 1984, pp. 22–24; Duignan & Gann 1994, 25-29 betlar
  96. ^ The Glasgow Herald & 1 May 1975

Newspaper and journal articles

Onlayn manbalar

Bibliografiya